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THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY ON
THE APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND FOREIGN PRIVILEGE LAWS IN
U.S. PATENT LITIGATION
Robert A. McFarlanet
Abstract
The attorney-client privilege is a testimonial privilege that
allows clients to refuse to disclose, and to prevent others from
disclosing, confidential communications with their attorneys that are
made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. Both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have ruled that the privilege
applies in the context of patent prosecution. However, U.S. attorneys
face considerable uncertainty when asserting the attorney-client
privilege to protect confidential communications between clients and
their foreign patent agents and attorneys. This uncertainty arises
because U.S. courts largely decide privilege disputes pertaining to
foreign patent prosecution by applying the law of the nation in which
the foreign patent application was filed.
Following a brief introduction in Section I, Section I reviews the
trend of applying the attorney-client privilege more broadly to
attorney-client communications with U.S. patent attorneys and patent
agents. Section II addresses the principles governing the assertion of
the privilege to protect communications made in the course offoreign
patent prosecution. Section IV concludes by explaining how the
practitioner may benefit from recognizing the uncertainty that
applying foreign privilege in this area of law may cause.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege is a testimonial privilege that allows
clients to refuse to disclose, and to prevent others from disclosing,
confidential communications with their attorneys that are made for
the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.' The privilege has
long been a pillar of the United States legal system 2 and is widely
viewed as necessary to promote full and frank discussions between
attorneys and their clients.3 In order to fulfill the purpose of furthering
such candid communications, courts seek to apply the privilege with
predictability, so that the attorney and client know which of their
communications are protected and, conversely, which may be subject
to compelled disclosure.4
In contrast with other areas of law, courts were slow to apply the
attorney-client privilege to confidential communications between
patent attorneys and their clients. Historically, the attorney-client
privilege simply did not apply to patent prosecution because courts
1. See, e.g., Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534
U.S. 1066 (2001) ("Federal common law recognizes a privilege for communications between
client and attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, provided such communications
were intended to be confidential."). See generally 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §503.10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew
Bender 2d ed. 2006).
2. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (describing the attorney-
client privilege as "the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the
common law").
3. See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfarhzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
The lawyer must have the whole of his client's case, or he cannot pretend to give
any useful advice.... That the whole will not be told to counsel unless the
privilege is confidential, is perfectly clear. [Clients] who seek[ ] advice, seek[ ] it
because [they] believe[] that [they] may do so safely; [they] will rarely make
disclosure[s] which may be used against [them by making] ... adverse
witness[es] [out of their lawyers] ....
Id.
(quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2291 (McNaughton rev.
1961) (first omission in original)). See also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (noting that the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is to encourage "full and frank communications between attorneys
and their clients," and further that the privilege "recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client.").
4. See, e.g., Rhone-Puolenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indemn. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir.
1994) ("An uncertain privilege - or one which purports to be certain, but rests in widely varying
applications by the courts - is little better than no privilege.").
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did not generally consider such work to be legal in nature.5 The
Supreme Court finally recognized in 1963 that preparing and
prosecuting patent applications constitutes the practice of law,6
thereby opening the door to the protection of confidential
communications with patent attorneys under the attorney-client
privilege. The Supreme Court's decision did not, however,
immediately lead to the broad application of the privilege to patent
prosecution, and years of debate ensued as to whether the privilege
should protect communications with patent attorneys.7 Knogo Corp. v.
United States,8 an influential decision issued in 1980, and In re
Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc.,9 a Federal Circuit decision that
adopted much of Knogo's reasoning, largely settled this issue in favor
of applying the privilege in the context of patent prosecution. Patent
attorneys and their clients may now be reasonably confident that their
confidential communications exchanged in furtherance of obtaining
patent rights in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") may be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
U.S. practitioners, however, face considerable uncertainty when
asserting the attorney-client privilege to protect confidential
communications between clients and their foreign patent agents and
attorneys.10  This uncertainty arises because, as a matter of
international comity, U.S. courts largely decide privilege disputes
pertaining to foreign patent prosecution by applying the law of the
nation in which the foreign patent application was filed.' Naturally,
applying a patchwork of foreign privilege law leads to varying results
in cases involving U.S. patents with foreign counterparts. Courts may
be required to concurrently apply the privilege laws of multiple
nations. Further, the parties face considerable expense when disputes
5. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del.
1954).
[Attorneys] do not 'act as lawyers' when ... making initial office preparatory
determinations of patentability based on the inventor's information, prior art, or
legal tests for invention and novelty; when drafting or comparing patent
specifications and claims; when preparing the application for letters patent or
amendments thereto and prosecuting same in the Patent Office; when handling
interference proceedings in the Patent Office concerning patent applications.
Id.
6. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963).
7. See infra Section It.
8. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
9. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
10. See infra Section Ii.
11. See, e.g., Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 520 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
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arise that encompass privilege issues pertaining to foreign patent
agents and attorneys in several jurisdictions.1 2
Section II of this article reviews the trend to apply the privilege
more broadly to attorney-client communications with U.S. patent
attorneys and patent agents. Section III addresses the principles
governing the assertion of the privilege to protect communications
made in the course of foreign patent prosecution. Section IV
concludes by explaining how the practitioner may benefit from
recognizing the uncertainty that applying foreign privilege in this area
of law may cause.
II. COURTS BROADLY APPLY ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS WITH U.S. PATENT ATTORNEYS
Even though the Supreme Court clearly held in Sperry that
patent prosecution constitutes the practice of law, 13 lower courts were
slow to afford communications between patent applicants and their
attorneys protection under the attorney-client privilege. Courts'
hesitance to extend the privilege is evident in Jack Winter, Inc. v.
Koratron Co., the leading case refusing to meaningfully apply the
privilege to patent prosecution. 14 According to Jack Winter, much of
the information provided by the client to the patent attorney during
prosecution consists of nothing more than technical material that the
attorney is under a statutory duty to disclose to the USPTO. 15 Jack
Winter reasoned that, since the patent attorney is required to disclose
all such information to the patent examiner, he or she "exercises no
discretion as to what portion of this information must be relayed to
the Patent Office[,] ... and [merely] acts as a conduit between his
12. See, e.g., In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig. (Rivastigmine 1), 237 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (considering the privilege laws of some 37 different countries).
13. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963).
14. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Jack Winter
proved to be quite influential and many district courts followed its restrictive approach to the
application of the privilege. See, e.g., Bulk Lift Int'l, Inc. v. Flexcon & Sys., Inc., 122 F.R.D.
482, 492-93 (W.D. La. 1988), affd 122 F.R.D. 493 (W.D. La. 1988); Howes v. Medical
Components, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1511, 1512 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("The attorney-client privilege does
not protect technical information meant primarily to aid in the completion of a patent
application."); Accord Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 155 (W.D.N.Y.
1982) (stating that the attorney-client privilege does not protect technical information
communicated to the attorney that does not call for a legal opinion or interpretation and that is
meant primarily for aid in completing patent applications); Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91
F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D. Il1. 1980); Choat v. Rome Indus. Inc., 462 F. Supp. 728, 732 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
15. Jack Winter, 50 F.R.D. at 228.
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client and the Patent Office." 16 Consequently, the court concluded that
a basic element of the attorney-client privilege is absent, namely that
the communication is not simply to be relayed to others outside of the
confidential relationship, but is intended "for the attorney's ears
alone."'17 This determination that the patent attorney was little more
than a conduit of information between the client and the patent
examiner significantly limited the scope of the privilege in patent
prosecution, and courts following Jack Winter generally declined to
protect technical communications provided by the client to the patent
attorney.' 8 Indeed, one case following Jack Winter went so far as to
hold that "any question relating to the original patent application and
the [related] thoughts, discussions, advice, etc., would be discoverable
as to that limited subject unless it was for a legal opinion aside from
the application."' 9
The Jack Winter court's circumscribed view of the role of the
patent attorney and the correspondingly narrow view of the attorney-
client privilege in patent prosecution "provoked a strong resistance"
from those who believed the decision misunderstood the "intricate
nature of the patent attorney-client relationship. ' 20 Knogo Corp. v.
United States2' strongly criticized the Jack Winter view of patent
prosecution 22 and articulated a much broader and more accurate view
of the patent attorney's role:
The reality of the cooperative effort put forth by the inventor and
the attorney is far different from the Jack Winter portrayal. The
technical discussions between attorney and client enable the
attorney to extract from this information one or more patentable
inventions. The attorney then drafts one or more patent
applications in accordance with the requirements of the federal
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Bulk Lift, 122 F.R.D. at 492-93.
19. McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 136 F.R.D. 666, 669 (D. Colo. 1991).
20. Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 827 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (E.D. La. 1993).
21. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
22. Id. at 940.
The conclusion reached by the authorities in the Jack Winter camp rests upon an
oversimplification of the role performed by the patent attorney during the patent
application process. The attorney is not a mere conduit for either the client's
communications containing the technical information or the technical
information itself. He does not file his client's communications with the Patent
Office. He does not file transcripts of his conversations with the client regarding
technical matters and then await the issuance of a patent, yet this is the
impression one derives from a reading of the Jack Winter view.
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statutes and regulations. The attorney has no duty to transmit
information which is not material to the examination of the
application. The application for patent is reviewed by the client,
and once approved, it is signed by the client and then filed in the
Patent Office by the attorney on behalf of the client. The signed,
sworn, and filed application might be considered a communication
for relay and not for the attorney's ears alone, but the same cannot
be said about the technical communications which preceded the
signed, sworn, and filed patent application.
23
The Knogo court concluded that preparing a patent application is
analogous to preparing a civil complaint.24 In both situations, the
client provides information to his or her lawyer so the lawyer may
prepare a publicly filed document. However, the fact that the client
intends some or even most of the information to be publicly disclosed
through the complaint or patent application does not waive the
privilege. 25  Thus, Knogo reasoned, whether an attorney-client
communication during patent prosecution is privileged should be
determined by the well-established test applied in other contexts, e.g.,
whether the client intended the communication to be confidential.26
Knogo's analytical framework, and its broader view of the attorney-
client privilege, soon overtook the narrow view of Jack Winter and
became the majority view on this issue.27
23. Id. at 940-41 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
24. Id. at 941.
25. Id. (citing Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968)).
26. See id. (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.
Mass. 1950)).
27. See Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 2, 3 (D. Mass. 1993)
("Although some courts still adhere to the Jack Winter line of cases, the majority of courts have
viewed the role of the patent attorney more expansively and have afforded considerable
protection to attorney-client communications [in patent prosecution]."); Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372, 375-78 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(criticizing Jack Winters and adopting Knogo); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 202
(E.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Space Sys./Loral Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
1063, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
This Court is persuaded that Knogo's approach is the more appropriate one.
Technical information communicated to a patent attorney does not seem to
warrant different treatment than any information communicated to an attorney in
the process of obtaining legal services. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege
may apply [in patent prosecution] just as it may apply to any communication
between a client and his or her attorney.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Spalding Sports
Worldwide, Inc. cemented Knogo's dominance. 28 The narrow issue
raised by Spalding was whether the attorney-client privilege may
protect "invention records," i.e. standard forms generally used by
corporations as a means for inventors to provide basic information
regarding their inventions to corporate patent attorneys. 29 The Federal
Circuit applied its own law30  to unambiguously hold that the
invention record at issue was privileged because it was provided to an
attorney "for the purpose of securing primarily legal opinion, or legal
services, or assistance in a legal proceeding."' 3 The Federal Circuit
further adopted Knogo's reasoning that the technical nature of the
invention record did not render the document subject to disclosure
because the document at least implicitly requested legal advice on
patentability and legal services in connection with preparation of the
patent application.32  Finally, the Federal Circuit referenced the
"conduit theory" of the Jack Winter line of cases, stating that such
decisions were not binding on the Federal Circuit, and concluded that
"the better rule is the one articulated in the [Federal Circuit's
decision]" i.e. the rule stated in Knogo.
33
District courts have not limited application of Spalding to the
narrow category of invention records specifically considered by the
Federal Circuit. Instead, lower courts have consistently relied on
Spalding's favorable view of Knogo and its criticism of Jack Winter
to hold that confidential communications made between the patent
attorney and his or her client during prosecution, including those in
28. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (also holding
that the application of the attorney-client privilege to patent prosecution was an issue of
substantive patent law that is governed by Federal Circuit law).
29. Id. at 802 n.2.
30. The Federal Circuit applies the law of the regional circuit in which the district court's
decision was issued on all non-patent issues, and its own precedent on issues of substantive
patent law. Id. at 803. The Federal Circuit concluded that application of the attorney-client
privilege to the invention record was unique to patent law, and, therefore, applied Federal
Circuit law. Id. at 803-04.
31. Id. at 805 (citing Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 940). The Federal Circuit also noted that
patent prosecution constituted the practice of law under Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383
(1963). Id. at 805-06.
32. Id. at 806. The Court further held that the entire document was privileged because its
"overall tenor" was a request for legal advice and services and, further, that it was sufficient to
establish the privilege that such request could be fairly implied from the document without an
express request for legal assistance. Id.
33. Id. at 806 n.3.
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which the client shares technical information, may be protected if
they meet the privilege requirements imposed in other legal fields.34
Significantly, the privilege as enunciated in Knogo protects
communications with patent agents who are not admitted as attorneys,
so long as their activities are conducted under the supervision or at the
direction of a licensed attorney.35 Courts, however, have not yet
reached agreement regarding application of the privilege to patent
agents who work independently without the supervision or direction
34. See Avago Techs. Gen. IP PTE Ltd. v. Elan Microelectronics Corp., No. C04-
05385JW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86292, at *34 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2006) (applying the
attorney-client privilege to protect draft patent applications); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels,
Inc., No. 1:04 CV 2357, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4998, at *15 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 9, 2006)
(applying the attorney-client privilege to protect documents exchanged between the patent
prosecution attorney and client, including a search report generated during prosecution);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 480 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (after noting
that the "application of the attorney-client privilege to patent practice has developed
dramatically in the last half-century," the court concluded that "[wihere client and counsel share
technical information, that communication is privileged as long as it was made for the purpose
of securing legal advice or legal services, or conveying legal advice"); Universal City Dev.
Ptnrs., Ltd. v. Ride & Show Eng'g, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 688, 696 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ("The analysis of
the attorney-client privilege is no different in patent representation matters than in other types of
representations"); In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 182 (D. N.J. 2003) (holding
that documents confidentially provided to the patent attorney by the client that "relate to the
preparation and prosecution of the patent application.., fall within the purview of the attorney
client privilege as it is defined in Spalding"); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No.
98 C 3952, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13607, *14-16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2000) aff'd in part, rev'd
in part 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13606 (N.D. I11. 2000) (rejecting argument that Spalding applied
only to narrow category of documents known as "invention records"); Softview Computer
Prods., Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., U.S.P.Q.2d 1422 (S.D. N.Y. March 31, 2000) (concluding that
"the fact that a communication between a lawyer and his or her client relates to patent
prosecution and contains technical information does not make it ineligible for protection by the
attorney-client privilege."). A small minority of courts read Spalding narrowly and have
declined to extend its holding beyond the specific category of documents known as invention
records that were at issue before the Federal Circuit. See Fordham v. Onesoft Corp., No. Civ.A.
00-1078-A, 2000 WL 33341416, *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6,2000).
35. See, e.g., Rivastigmine 1, 237 F.R.D. 69, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gorman v. Polar
Electro., Inc., 137 F. Supp.2d 223, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM
Remediation Servs. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 431, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the attorney-client
privilege has been extended to representatives of the attorney, including administrative
practitioners such as patent agents employed by patent attorneys); Golden Trade v. Lee Apparel
Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding that if a patent agent is acting to
assist an attorney in providing legal services, the client's communications with him should come
within the privilege, and if the patent agent is not assisting an attorney, the privilege should not
be invoked). See generally United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.
Mass. 1950) ("The privilege applies only if... the person to whom the communication was
made [ ] is a member of a bar of a court, or his subordinate .... "); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §503.12[3][b] (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2006) (noting that the attorney-client privilege
generally protects the communications to staff, consultants and agents of the attorney).
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of a licensed attorney.36 Some district courts hold that, since
registered patent agents are not attorneys, the attorney-client privilege
should not be expanded to protect communications between them and
their clients. 3 Others apply the privilege equally to patent agents and
patent attorneys in prosecution matters before the USPTO, whether or
not the patent agent is working as a subordinate to an attorney.38
These more liberal cases reason that:
Congress, in creating the Patent Office, has expressly permitted
both patent attorneys and patent agents to practice before that
office. The registered patent agent is required to have a full and
working knowledge of the law of patents and is even regulated by
the same standards, including the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as are applied to attorneys in all courts. Thus, in
appearance and fact, the registered patent agent stands on the same
footing as an attorney in proceedings before the Patent Office....
As a result, in order not to frustrate this congressional scheme, the
attorney-client privilege must be available to communications of
registered patent agents.
39
This line of cases, however, strictly limits application of the privilege
to proceedings before the USPTO, and stops short of creating any
general privilege for agent-client communications on other matters.4°
Thus, it is now clear that clients may have candid
communications with their U.S. patent attorneys, U.S. patent agents
working under the direction of patent attorneys and, perhaps, U.S.
36. See, e.g., Gorman, 137 F. Supp.2d at 227 ("Whether [the attorney-client privilege]
applies to a patent agent is not a straightforward issue and has been the subject of disagreement
among various federal court[s].").
37. See, e.g., Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods., Inc., No. 00-10836-GAO, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14269, at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2002). See also Rivastigmine 1, 237 F.R.D. 69, 74
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that privilege applies to patent agents only if they are working under
the authority and control of an attorney); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C
3952, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13607, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2000) ("Ordinarily, communications
between a client and a patent agent are not subject to the attorney-client privilege" (citing
McCook Metals L.L.C. v. Alcoa, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 242, 256 (N.D. III. 2000)); Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 616 (E.D.N.C. 1992) ('""[N]o
communications from patent agents ... are subject to an attorney-client privilege in the United
States."' (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 1146 (D.C.S.C. 1975)).
38. See, e.g., Mold-Masters Ltd. v. Husky Injection Molding Syst., Ltd., No. 01 C 1576,
2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 17168, *1213 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2001); In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litigation (Ampicillin), 81 F.R.D. 377, 393 (D.D.C. 1978). Accord Dow Chemical Co. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. 129, 133-34 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (applying privilege to
patent agents registered to practice in the USPTO).
39. Ampicillin, 81 F.R.D. at 393.
40. See, e.g., Mold Masters Ltd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17168, at *12-13 (applying the
privilege to patent agents "within the narrow realm of patent proceedings before the [USPTO]").
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patent agents working independently to prosecute patent applications
in the USPTO and that such communications will be afforded the
same privileges as communications with attorneys acting in other
fields of representation.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
TO THE PROSECUTION OF FOREIGN PATENTS
REMAINS HIGHLY CASE SPECIFIC
District Courts are often asked to weigh assertions of the
attorney-client privilege as to confidential communications between
clients and their foreign patent attorneys or agents that were made in
the course of patent prosecution outside the United States. These
issues arise, for example, in domestic patent litigation where the U.S.
patent at issue has foreign counterparts. 4 1 Typically, the party accused
of patent infringement will seek discovery of (1) USPTO file history;
(2) the file history of continuation, continuation-in-part, and
divisional patents or patent applications; (3) related foreign patents
and patent applications; and (4) documents and communications with
the prosecuting attorneys and patent agents. Consequently, when the
patent-in-suit has related foreign patents or patent applications, the
court will likely need to analyze privilege issues related to both U.S.
and foreign prosecution files.
A. Principles of Comity Generally Require Courts to Apply
Foreign Law to Determine Whether Communications With
Foreign Patent Agents and Attorneys Are Privileged
Despite the recent trend toward broader and more predictable
application of the attorney-client privilege to domestic patent
prosecution, difficulties remain in applying the privilege to the work
of foreign patent attorneys and agents. This area of the law is
particularly complex because principles of comity generally mandate
the application of foreign privilege laws to patent prosecution taking
place outside the United States. International comity is a centuries-old
doctrine 42 under which domestic tribunals decide cases "touching the
41. See, e.g., Polyvision Corp. v. Smart Techs., Inc., No. 1:03-CV-476, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12688, *2-3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2006) (foreign patent application at issue was a
Canadian counterpart to the pertinent U.S. application).
42. The Supreme Court referred to the doctrine of international comity as early as the
Eighteenth Century. See Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. 369, 370, n.(b) (1797) (citing 2 V. HUBER,
PRAELECTIONES JURIS ROMANI ET HODIEMI, bk. 1, tit. 3, pp. 26-31 (C. Thomas, L. Menke, & G.
Gebauer eds. 1725)).
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laws and interests of other sovereign states" with a "spirit of
cooperation. 43
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.4
Principles of comity direct courts to balance competing interests
of the United States against those of foreign sovereigns in cases
involving activities in a foreign nation or the interests of a foreign
nation in having its laws apply.
45
In determining whether U.S. or foreign law should govern the
privilege status of a communication with a foreign patent attorney or
patent agent, courts typically undertake a "traditional choice-of-law
'contacts' analysis." 46 Generally, federal courts defer to the law of
the country that has the "predominant" or "most direct and
compelling interest" in whether the communications should remain
confidential, unless the applicable foreign law is contrary to U.S.
public policy. 47  Thus, courts have concluded that "any
communications touching base with the United States will be
governed by the federal discovery rules [including the U.S.
formulation of the attomey-client privilege,] while any
communications related to matters solely involving [a foreign
country] will be governed by the applicable foreign statute. ' 48
43. See Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Arrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543
n. 27 (1987).
44. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
45. See, e.g., In re Honda Am. Motor Co., 168 F.R.D. 535, 537 (D. Md. 1996) (citing
First Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Reinhart Vertreib's AG, 116 F.R.D. 8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).
46. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(citing Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1991)).
47. Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 92, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See
also Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 521 (foreign law will be applied "unless that law is clearly
inconsistent with important policies embodied in federal law.").
48. Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 520 (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc. 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1169-70 (D.S.C. 1975)). Application of foreign privilege laws has also been
explained with reference to Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See, e.g., VLT Corp. v. Unitrode
Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 14-15 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 521). Rule 501
was enacted to govern issues of privilege "by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience,... [and]
with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis." Id. (citing Fed.R.Evid.
501 and Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)). This flexibility allows the courts "to
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Under these basic principles, the first step in analyzing claims of
privilege relating to foreign patent prosecution has become
straightforward in recent decisions. Communications between a
foreign client and a foreign patent attorney or patent agent relating to
the prosecution of a U.S. patent application are deemed to "touch
base" with this country and are, therefore, governed by American
privilege law.49 Conversely, the privilege laws of the nation in which
the patent application was filed govern communications with foreign
attorneys and patent agents relating to the prosecution of a foreign
client's patent in foreign a country.50  Additional examples of
communications between foreign clients and their foreign patent
agents and attorneys that do not "touch base" with the U.S., and that
are therefore governed by foreign privilege laws, include those
regarding the formulation of licensing and enforcement policies for
foreign patents, providing advice on the possible infringement of
foreign patents, addressing matters of foreign patent law, rendering
legal advice on the patent laws of a foreign jurisdiction and those
communications that are produced by or on behalf of a foreign patent
attorney or agent that relate solely to matters outside the United
States.5
Thus, there is little dispute among the district courts that
privilege assertions relating to the prosecution of foreign patents must
be reviewed under the laws of the appropriate foreign jurisdiction so
long as the communications at issue do not "touch base" with the
look to the law of other jurisdictions as guides when those jurisdictions have a strong interest in
the [attorney-client] relationship at issue." Id. (citing Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 521). VLT
Corp. specifically notes that the "other" jurisdictions contemplated by Rule 501 include foreign
countries. Id. at 15 n.3.
49. Tulip Computers Int'l. BV v. Dell Computer Corp., 210 F.R.D. 100, 104 (D. Del.
2002); Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 520 (citing Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1169-70).
50. Tulip Computers, 210 F.R.D. at 104; Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D. at 520. See also
Rivastigmine 1, 237 F.R.D. 69, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
If a communication with a foreign patent agent involves a U.S. patent
application, then U.S. privilege law applies.... If a communication with a
foreign patent agent involves a foreign patent application, then as a matter of
comity, the law of that foreign country is considered regarding whether the law
provides a privilege comparable to the attorney client privilege.
Id.
51. Odone v. Croda Int'l PLC, 950 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1997) ("The common
denominator of the cases in which federal courts afford comity to foreign statutes governing the
privileges of patent agents is that the communications related solely to activities outside the
United States."); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp.
1429, 1445-46 (D. Del. 1989). Similarly, courts may apply foreign privilege laws to
communications that have no more than an incidental connection to the U.S. See VLT Corp., 194
F.R.D. at 16.
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United States. Indeed, the decision to apply the privilege law of the
foreign country has become so predictable that parties often simply
agree that the law of the country in which the application was filed
will govern.
52
Although the Federal Circuit has not specifically ruled on this
privilege issue, it would likely follow the majority rule established in
the numerous district court cases cited above. First, the Federal
Circuit generally defers to regional circuit law on issues of comity.53
Second, even if the Federal Circuit determined that the application of
the attorney-client privilege was within its unique statutory authority
and, therefore, that its own law governed the issue, it would likely
apply the foreign privilege law as a matter of comity. 54 Finally, the
district court decisions on the application of comity to determine
privilege issues related to foreign patent prosecution have reached
such a level of uniformity that there would appear to be little basis or
motivation for the Federal Circuit to chart a new course in this area.
B. Applying Foreign Privilege Laws Leads to Complex
Analysis, Varying Results, and Expensive Discovery
Disputes
A finding that an allegedly privileged communication does not
"touch base" with the United States only begins the privilege inquiry
because it requires the court to analyze the privilege as it exists under
the law of the applicable country.55 Indeed, application of disparate
foreign privilege laws in this second step of the analysis is what
causes the analytical difficulties and unpredictability in this area.
The complexities of reviewing privilege issues under foreign
laws are typified by those cases seeking production of documents
relating to Japanese patent prosecution.5 6 In Japanese practice, legal
professionals called benrishi act as patent agents or patent prosecution
52. See, e.g., Murata Mfg., Co. v. Bel Fuse Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37774, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2005) (parties agreeing Japanese law governed assertion of
privilege); Eisai Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Inc., 406 F. Supp.2d 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(same).
53. See Int'l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
54. See Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (using "long-established principles of international comity" in review of foreign
judgment).
55. Tulip Computers Int'l BV v. Dell Computer Corp., 210 F.R.D. 100, 104 (D. Del.
2002).
56. See, e.g., Eisai Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Inc., 406 F. Supp.2d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 12-13 (D. Mass 2000).
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attorneys do in the United States. 7 Specifically, benrishi represent
clients in prosecuting patents before the Japanese Patent Office,
advise clients on contracts relating to intellectual property rights, and
assist Japanese attorneys, who are called bengoshi, in representing
clients in intellectual property litigation. 8 Since 1998,' 9 American
courts generally recognize that Japanese law accords protection
similar to the attorney-client privilege that prevents the compelled
disclosure of confidential benrishi-client communications and
documents created by benrishi.60 Since allowing litigants to withhold
discovery reflecting confidential benrishi-client communications does
not offend, and is in fact consistent with, policy goals of American
law to foster candid attorney-client communications, U.S. courts
consistently respect this Japanese privilege and refuse to compel the
production of such documents. 6' Courts have similarly found that the
laws of many countries including the Netherlands,62 Great Britain,63
and Germany 64 recognize a privilege between patent agents and their
clients and, consequently, have not permitted discovery that would
invade the privilege. Significantly, these courts recognize the patent
agent-client privilege under foreign law whether or not they would be
willing to recognize a similar privilege under American law.65
57. Eisai Ltd., 406 F. Supp.2d at 341.
58. Id.
59. Prior to January 1, 1998, documents held by parties in Japanese litigation were not
generally subject to mandatory production. The Japanese Code was amended effective January
1, 1998, to allow for more liberal, American-style discovery. See VLT Corp., 194 F.R.D. at 17.
60. See id
61. Id. at 18. See also Eisai Ltd, 406 F. Supp.2d at 342-43.
62. See Organon Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 303 F. Supp.2d 546, 547 (D. N.J. 2004)
(finding privilege between Dutch patent agent and client); Tulip Computers Int'l BV v. Dell
Computer Corp., 210 F.R.D. 100, 104 (D. Del. 2002) (same).
63. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98C 3952, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13607 at * 13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2000) (finding privilege between U.K. patent agents and their
clients); Accord VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 19 (D. Mass 2000) (citing 33
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES, § 280 (4th ed. 1997)).
64. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding that German law protects communications between German patent agents and their
clients); Softview Computer Prods. Corp. v. Haworth, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1422, 1433 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (same).
65. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13607 at *9-10.
Although communications with domestic patent agents are generally denied the
protection of the attorney-client privilege, it would vitiate the principles of
comity and predictability of the privilege to extend that denial blindly to foreign
"patent agents" without reference to either the function they serve in their native
system or the expectations created under their local law.
Id. (citation omitted).
FOREIGN PRIVILEGE LAW IN PATENT CASES 681
The Southern District of New York undertook a detailed analysis
of the privilege as it exists under Swiss law in In re Rivastigmine
Patent Litigation, and concluded that communications between patent
agents and their clients are not privileged under the applicable laws of
Switzerland.66 The district court recognized that Swiss patent agents
owe their clients an ethical duty of confidentiality and that the Swiss
Federal Act provides that a judge "may exempt witnesses from the
disclosure of [such] professional secrets ... if 'their interest in
confidentiality outweighs the interest in disclosure,"' and "insofar as
another [Swiss] law does not require him to testify. '67 The district
court concluded, however, that the Swiss practitioner's professional
secrecy obligation to the client, which could be abridged by a Swiss
court when expedient, fell short of an absolute and inviolate privilege
as recognized under American law.68 Moreover, the Basel-City Code
of Civil Procedure, which did provide for a privilege against
testifying (although not against document production) for attorneys
within the jurisdiction, did not extend the privilege to patent agents. 69
Consequently, the court refused to imply a privilege where none
existed, and held that the communications with the Swiss patent agent
at issue were not covered by an attorney-client privilege.70 Courts
have similarly found there is no privilege protecting communications
between patent agents and their clients in Canada7' and France.72
IV. PATENTEES MAY TAKE STEPS TO BENEFIT FROM
BROADER FOREIGN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
PRIVILEGE IN SOME CASES
Application of the attorney-client privilege to patent prosecution
has significantly evolved as courts have recognized that patent
attorneys do, in fact, practice law and that their client communications
are worthy of the privilege protections afforded in most other legal
endeavors. Recent decisions following Knogo and Spalding clearly
66. In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig. (Rivastigmine 11), 239 F.R.D. 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
67. Id. at *24.
68. Id. at *21-22.
69. Id. at *27.
70. Id. at *29-30.
71. Polyvision Corp. v. Smart Techs., Inc., No. :03-CV-476, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12688, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2006) (citing Santrade, Ltd. v. General Elec. Co., 150 F.R.D.
539, 547 (E.D.N.C. 1993) and finding that Canadian law does not recognize a privilege between
a Canadian patent agent and his or her client).
72. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 188 F.R.D. 189, 200-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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establish that the privilege may be applied to protect the confidential
attorney-client communications made in the furtherance of patent
prosecution before the USPTO, thereby strengthening application of
the privilege to domestic patent prosecution.73
The relative predictability in applying the privilege to domestic
patent prosecution has eluded courts analyzing application of the
privilege to foreign prosecution files sought during U.S. patent
litigation. Recent decisions discussed above establish that the
privileges attaching to foreign prosecution matters relevant to U.S.
litigation are to be governed in large part by the laws of the country
where the prosecution took place. This approach forces courts to
undertake complex analysis of unfamiliar statutes, create varying
results depending on the laws of the applicable foreign country, and
may result in the laws of several nations controlling privilege issues
in a single domestic patent litigation.
Moreover, the party asserting the privilege bears the burden to
establish the existence of the confidential relationship between the
patentee and the foreign attorney or agent and that the privilege as
construed in the country at issue protects the relevant
communications. 74 Thus, in cases involving communications with
foreign attorneys or patent agents in multiple jurisdictions, litigants
often have little choice but to submit extensive analysis of the
privilege laws of each relevant jurisdiction as well as declarations
from attorneys who practice in those countries. 75 Needless to say,
privilege disputes involving multiple foreign jurisdictions can be
expensive and time-consuming exercises for the litigants as well as
the court.
Despite the expense and complexity of applying foreign laws to
these disputes, there is little basis for courts to extend the reach of
U.S. privilege laws to extraterritorial patent prosecution in all
instances. First, seeking to broadly apply U.S. law in order to make
applying the privilege to foreign prosecution would, paradoxically,
undermine the U.S. policy goal of creating predictability and certainty
in the application of the attorney-client privilege. When attorneys or
73. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. 936 (Ct. CI. 1980); In re Spalding Sports
Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
74. See Rivastigmine 1, 237 F.R.D. 69, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
75. Id. (In addition to citing numerous court authorities, the party asserting the attorney-
client privilege submitted declarations of attorneys from numerous countries, including Brazil,
The Czech Republic, Greece, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Pakistan, The
Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, and the United
Kingdom, to support its claims of privilege in those jurisdictions.).
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patent agents represent clients in patent prosecution matters in their
home countries, they naturally expect that communications with their
clients will be protected, or not protected as the case may be, pursuant
to the privilege laws of the countries in which they practice.7 6 They
have no reasonable expectation that the privilege status of their
communications will be subsequently reevaluated under the laws of
the United States, or under the laws of any other country in which a
related patent may ultimately be litigated. Therefore, any retroactive
application of U.S. privilege law to foreign prosecution matters would
undermine the original expectations of the client and the patent
attorney or agent, as well as any certainty that existed under the
national laws governing the original patent prosecution. Second,
increasing the predictability of foreign privilege analysis in U.S.
patent litigation by applying U.S. privilege law to communications
between foreign patent agents and their foreign clients would violate
the long-established principles of international comity. Clearly, in
most cases, the sovereign state in which a patent office is located has
the most "direct and compelling interest" in the privilege status of
communications related to its local patent prosecution, and comity
requires the application of the laws of that nation. 77 Finally, the
numerous, well-reasoned district court decisions that consistently
apply the principles of comity to foreign patent prosecution along
with the dearth of contrary authorities leave parties little basis to
argue in favor of applying U.S. privilege laws to entirely foreign
patent prosecutions.
Patentees may, however, find that the application of foreign
privilege laws work to their benefit in some cases. As discussed
above, many countries have attorney-client privileges that provide
broader protection than the U.S. privilege. For example, jurisdictions
including Japan, Great Britain and Germany maintain a privilege that
generally protects confidential communications between a client and
his or her patent agents, whether or not the agent is working under the
78
control of a licensed attorney. Patentees seeking to cloak within the
attorney-client privilege communications with patent agents in such
countries may find that the resources spent to establish the scope of
the privilege in these countries are a good investment that will allow
them to protect communications with patent agents that would be
76. See, e.g., Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharms., Inc. 208 F.R.D. 92, 99 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
77. Id. at 98.
78. See supra Section III.B.
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subject to compelled disclosure under U.S. law. Ironically, the policy
goal underlying the attorney-client privilege in the United States,
namely to facilitate candid communications between clients and their
legal advisors, may be better served in some instances by applying the
laws of foreign jurisdictions instead of the laws of many U.S. courts
that do not recognize a privilege between clients and patent agents in
all instances.
V. CONCLUSION
The expansion of the attorney-client privilege in patent
prosecution matters before the USPTO has been defined by three
seminal cases. First, the Supreme Court recognized in Sperry that
patent prosecution constitutes the practice of law. Second, the Court
of Claims' influential Knogo decision set forth a rigorous legal
framework for applying the privilege to communications made in the
course of U.S. patent prosecution. Third, the Federal Circuit approved
of Knogo's reasoning in Spalding. These cases and their progeny have
led to a fair degree of predictability and certainty in the resolution of
privilege disputes relating to the prosecution of U.S. patents.
As discussed above, the results are far less predictable when
patentees assert the privilege to protect materials relating to foreign
patent prosecution. Federal courts have been unable to articulate
principles to govern application of the privilege in all such cases
because international comity requires courts to apply the laws of the
country in which a foreign patent application was filed to determine if
the related communications are privileged. Consequently, resolution
of privilege issues pertaining to foreign files will necessarily remain
case-specific and dependent upon the varying privilege laws of
foreign nations. U.S. litigators should recognize the likelihood that
foreign privilege laws will arise in U.S. patent litigations whenever
the patent-in-suit has related foreign patents or patent applications,
identify any difficulties presented by the applicable foreign laws, and
direct their litigation strategies accordingly.
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